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THE JUDICIARY AND POPULAR DEMOCRACY: SHOULD
COURTS REVIEW BALLOT MEASURES PRIOR TO
ELECTIONS?
"[T]he attempt to . . . obstruct the freedom of elections ... if
successful, would result in the overthrow of all liberty regulated by
law .... If the courts can [order that an election not be held] from fear
of some imaginary wrong, then people ... are entirely subservient to the
courts, and the consequences are too fearful to contemplate."*
"[Plossible results of an abuse of judicial power will not [provide] a
reason for denial of court review .... Powers of a court ... are not
measured by what might be done through an arrogant and high-handed
abuse of its legitimate authority."**
INTRODUCTION
Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have supplemented
the powers of their legislatures with provisions for popular legislation,
which permit voters either to enact or to repeal constitutional amend-
ments or statutes, or both.1 Popular legislation is recognized as a legiti-
Walton v. Develing, 61 Ill. 201, 205-06 (1871).
** State ex rel Linde v. Hall, 35 N.D. 34, 40, 159 N.W. 281, 283 (1916).
1. Fifteen states permit use of popular legislation to enact both constitutional
amendments and statutes. See Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1 (1), (2); Ark. Const. amend.
VII, § 1; Cal. Coast. art. II, § 8(a) (1911, amended 1976); Colo. Const. art. V, § I(1)
(1910, amended 1980); Mass. Coast. amend. XLVIII, Definition, pt. 1; Mich. Coast. art.
II, § 9 (statute); id. art. XII, § 2 (constitutional amendment); Mo. Coast. art. III, § 49;
Mont. Coast. art. III, § 4(1) (statute); id. art. XIV, § 90) (constitutional amendment);
Neb. Coast. art. III, § 2; Nev. Const. art. XIX, § 2(1) (1912, amended 1972); ND.
Const. art. III, § 1; Ohio Coast. art. II, § 1; Okla. Coast. art. V, § 1; Or. Coast. art. IV,
§l(2)(a) (1902, amended 1968); S.D. Coast. art. III, §1 (statute); id. art. XXIII, § I (con-
stitutional amendment) (1898, amended 1972). Two states restrict use of the initiative to
enactment of constitutional amendments. See Fla. Const. art. XI, § 3 (1968, amended
1972); Il. Coast. art. XIV, § 3. Six states and the District of Columbia restrict use of the
initiative to enactment of statutes. See Alaska Coast. art. XI, § 1; Idaho Const. art. III,
§ 1 (1912, amended 1980); Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18 (1909, amended 1980); Utah
Coast. art. VI, § 1; Wash. Const. art. II, § 1 (1912, amended 1981); Wyo. Coast. art. III,
§ 52(a); D.C. Code Ann. § 1-281(a) (1981). Common to all twenty-four of these political
units is that at some stage in the process, voters can initiate and subsequently approve
measures. In a few states, once voters initiate a proposal, it is first sent to the state
legislature for approval. If the legislature declines such approval, the measure is certified
to be voted on by the public. See, e.g., Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18 (1909, amended
1981); Mass. Coast. amend. XLVIII, Initiative, pt. 5, § 1 (1918, amended 1950); Nev.
Const. art. XIX, § 2(3) (1912, amended 1972). In the majority of states, the proposal
qualifies for the ballot without passing through the legislature. See, eg., Cal. Coast. art.
II, § 8(b), (c) (1911, amended 1976). Regardless of the method, the emphasis is on popu-
lar control of the legislative machinery. In several states, the voters are empowered to
enact constitutional amendments, but only after the legislature has placed them on the
ballot. See, e.g., Ky. Const. § 256 (1891, amended 1979); La. Coast. art. XIII, § l(1)(a);
Miss. Const. art. XV, § 273 (1890, amended 1958). Because the content of such measures
is determined by the legislature and not the voters, the measures are not popular in na-
ture and are therefore not within the scope of this Note.
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia also provide for popular legislation in
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mate law-enacting mechanism.2 The products of this process, whether
constitutional amendments or statutes, are equally as valid as those of the
state legislature.3
States allowing for popular legislation attempt to check the process by
mandating compliance with specific procedures, known as technical re-
quirements, before a measure may be placed on the ballot.4 In addition,
the form of the referendum, which allows voters to repeal recent enactments of the state
legislature. See Alaska Const. art. XI, § 1; Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(1), (3); Ark.
Const. amend. VII, § 1; Cal. Const. art. II, § 9(a) (1911, amended 1976); Colo. Const.
art. V, § 1(1) (1910, amended 1980); Idaho Const. art. III, § 1 (1912, amended 1980);
Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, §18 (1909, amended 1981); Mass. Const. amend. XLVIII, Ref-
erendum, pt. 1 (1918, amended 1950); Mich. Const. art. II, § 9; Mo. Const. art. III, § 49;
Mont. Const. art. III, § 5(1); Neb. Const. art. III, § 3; Nev. Const. art. XIX, § 1 (1904,
amended 1962); N.D. Const. art. III, § 1; Ohio Const. art. II, § 1; Okla. Const. art. V,
§ 1; Or. Const. art. IV, § 1(3)(a) (1902, amended 1968); S.D. Const. art. III, § I; Utah
Const. art. VI, § 1; Wash. Const. art. II, § 1 (1912, amended 1981); Wyo. Const. art. III,
§ 52(a); D.C. Code Ann. § 1-281(b) (1981).
2. See Sirico, The Constitutionality of the Initiative and Referendum, 65 Iowa L.
Rev. 637, 644 (1980). The United States Constitution provides that the federal govern-
ment will "guarantee to every State . . . a Republican Form of Government." U.S.
Const. art. IV, § 4. In Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912),
petitioner argued that popular legislation violated this provision and was therefore un-
constitutional. See id. at 137-38. The Supreme Court held that the challenge involved a
political question and that the Court did not possess the jurisdiction to hear it. See id. at
150-51; accord Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916) (settled rule
that constitutional validity of referendum is not a justiciable controversy).
No state court has ever held that its direct legislation system violates the federal consti-
tution. See, e.g., Iman v. Southern Pac. Co., 7 Ariz. App. 16, 20, 435 P.2d 851, 855
(1968); Ex parte Wagner, 21 Okla. 33, 35, 95 P. 435, 435 (1908); Kadderly v. City of
Portland, 44 Or. 118, 144-45, 74 P. 710, 720 (1903). But see Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. (4
Harr.) 479, 485-86 (1847) (dictum) (popular legislation violates the intentions of the
Founding Fathers as expressed in the Constitution).
3. The Supreme Court has recognized that while the people may delegate power to
legislative bodies, they mat' also reserve such power to themselves. See City of Eastlake
v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976) (municipal referendum). In several
states, the constitutional provision permitting popular legislation states that it is a power
reserved to the people. See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(1) (amendment, statute,
referendum); Ark. Const. amend. VII, § 1 (same); Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(1) (1910,
amended 1980) (same); Fla. Const. art. XI, § 3 (1968, amended 1972) (amendment);
Idaho Const. art. III, § 1 (1912, amended 1980) (statute, referendum); Mich. Const. art.
II, § 9 (same); Mo. Const. art. III, § 49 (amendment, statute, referendum); Neb. Coast.
art. III, § 2 (amendment, statute); id. § 3 (referendum); Nev. Coast. art. XIX, § 2(1)
(1912, amended 1972) (amendment, statute); N.D. Const. art. III, § 1 (amendment, stat-
ute, referendum); Ohio Coast. art. II, § I (same); Okla. Const. art. V, § 1 (same); Or.
Const. art. IV, § 1(2)(a) (1902, amended 1968) (amendment, statute); S.D. Coast. art. III,
§ 1 (statute, referendum); Wash. Coast. art. II, § 1 (1912, amended 1981) (statute, refer-
endum); cf. Utah Const. art. VI, § I (legislative power "vested" in people).
4. For example, Oregon requires that proponents of a proposed constitutional
amendment collect valid signatures in support of the proposal. The number of signatures
must equal eight percent of the total number of votes cast for all gubernatorial candidates
at the most recent general election held to elect a full-term governor. See Or. Const. art.
IV, § l(2)(c) (1902, amended 1968). The requirement is purely technical. If the propo-
nents do not gather sufficient signatures, the proposal is procedurally defective and may
not be submitted for approval. See Kays v. McCall, 244 Or. 361, 373-74, 418 P.2d 511,
517 (1966) (en banc) (per curiam). For a further discussion of technical requirements see
infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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proposals are subject to two types of content restrictions. The first type
is imposed by the constitutional provision authorizing the popular legis-
lation process and is specific to that process. For example, some states
provide that popular legislation may not encompass more than one topic5
or be either local or special in character.6 Some states also provide that
popular legislation may not apply to certain topics.7 Courts disagree on
whether state law provides for pre-election review of a ballot proposal to
determine if the content violates one of these specific restrictions.8 The
critical inquiry is whether the restriction in question should be viewed as
a threshold requirement that must be met if the election itself is to be
valid9 or as a limitation on the process of popular legislation. A limita-
tion, unlike a threshold requirement, has no effect on the election's valid-
ity, but rather determines whether the law-enacting body or mechanism
has the authority to enact particular legislation. 10 The answer to the in-
5. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. II, § 8(d) (1911, amended 1976) (amendment, statute);
Fla. Const. art. XI, § 3 (1968, amended 1972) (amendment); Mo. Const. art. III, § 50
(amendment, statute); Or. Const. art IV, § 1(2)(d) (1902, amended 1968) (same).
6. See, e.g., Alaska Const. art. XI, § 7 (statute, referendum); Mont. Coast. art. Ill,
§ 4(1) (statute); Wyo. Const. art. III, § 52(g) (statute, referendum).
7. See, e.g., Alaska Const. art. XI, § 7 (initiative or referendum not to be used to
dedicate revenue, make or repeal appropriations, create courts or define courts' jurisdic-
tion); Ill. Const. art. XIV, § 3 (initiative limited to structural and procedural subjects
contained in article IV of state constitution); Mass. Const. amend. XLVIII, Initiative, pt.
2, § 2 (initiative not to relate to religion, court system, search and seizure, martial law,
freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of elections or right of peaceful assembly);
id. Referendum, pt. 3, § 2 (referendum not to relate to religion or court system); Mo.
Const. art. III, § 51 (initiative may not be used for appropriations); Nev. Coast. art. XIX,
§ 6 (initiative may not propose expenditure without corresponding tax increase); Ohio
Const. art. II, § le (initiative or referendum not to be used to classify property in order to
tax at different rates); Wyo. Const. art. III, § 52(g) (initiative or referendum not to be
used to dedicate revenue or make appropriations; initiative not to affect courts); D.C.
Code Ann. § 1-281(a) (1981) (initiative not to be used to appropriate funds). In addition,
many states and the District of Columbia provide that the referendum may not be used to
repeal urgency laws, which are generally described as being necessary for the immediate
health and safety of the public. See, eg., Alaska Const. art. XI, § 7; Colo. Coast. art. V,
§ 1(3) (1910, amended 1980); Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(a); Ohio Const. art II, § ld; Okia.
Const. art. V, § 2; S.D. Const. art. III, § 1; Wash. Const. art. II, § l(b) (1912, amended
1981); Wyo. Const. art. III, § 52(g); D.C. Code Ann. § 1-281(b) (1981).
8. Compare Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 460 (Alaska 1974) (court may de-
termine whether proposal amounts to local or special legislation) and Bowe v. Secretary
of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 247-48, 69 N.E.2d 115, 127-28 (1946) (court may
determine whether initiative relates to excluded matter) with State ex rel. Bullard v. Os-
born, 16 Ariz. 247, 250-51, 143 P. 117, 118 (1914) (per curiam) (court may not determine
whether proposal amounts to local or special legislation). See infra notes 16-31 and ac-
companying text.
9. See supra note 4.
10. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. IV, § 9 (1911, amended 1976) (single subject require-
ment); Ill. Const. art. IV, § 13 (prohibition on local or special legislation if general law
can be passed). Missouri provides the best example of intent to make some restrictions
threshold requirements and others only limitations. One section of its constitution pro-
vides that "[p]etitions for constitutional amendments shall not contain more than one
amended and revised article. . . or one new article which shall not contain more than
one subject. . . . Petitions for laws shall contain not more than one subject. . . ." Mo.
Const. art. III, § 50. A different section provides that "[t]he initiative shall not be used
1985]
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quiry lies in the relevant state constitutional provision.
In addition to these restrictions specifically applicable to popular legis-
lation, the federal and state constitutions, as well as federal statutes, im-
pose general substantive constraints on both popular legislation and the
legislature. 1 Most courts will not entertain a substantive challenge to a
ballot proposal until it has been adopted.12 Other courts, however, un-
dertake such review. 3
This Note analyzes pre-election judicial review with regard to the two
types of content constraints on popular legislation. Part I illustrates that
of the states that have placed content restrictions on the popular legisla-
tion process, some intend these restrictions to be threshold requirements.
Pre-election review of a measure for compliance with such a restriction is
appropriate because the validity of the election itself is in question.
Other states intend only limitations on popular legislation in general.
Pre-election review is therefore improper because no violation occurs un-
til formal enactment. Part II demonstrates that courts should not review
a measure for general substantive validity until the measure has been en-
acted. This Note concludes that before an election, the judiciary may
review the procedure by which a measure has been proposed to ensure
that it conforms to state threshold requirements. Unless there are ex-
plicit constitutional prohibitions on the content of measures proposed by
popular legislation, however, the judiciary should defer to the system and
not review the substance of a measure until it has been formally enacted.
I. CONTENT RESTRICTIONS SPECIFIC TO POPULAR LEGISLATION
Pre-election judicial review of a proposal for alleged violations of con-
tent restrictions specific to the popular legislation process is necessarily
circumscribed by the language of the constitutional provision authorizing
popular legislation and by the legislative intent underlying that provi-
sion. 14 The question whether courts should exercise the power of review
for the appropriation of money other than of new revenues created and provided for
thereby." Id. § 51. The first provision relates to the sufficiency of the petition, while the
other is a specific limitation on the power of the initiative.
11. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981); see,
&g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969) (initiative amending city charter may
not violate fourteenth amendment); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S.
713, 736-37 (1964) (state initiative reapportioning state legislature may not violate four-
teenth amendment).
12. Grossman, The Initiative and Referendum Process: The Michigan Experience, 28
Wayne L. Rev. 77, 111 (1981); see, e.g., Iman v. Bolin, 98 Ariz. 358, 364-65, 404 P.2d
705, 709 (1965) (en banc); State ex rel. Cramer v. Brown, 7 Ohio St. 3d 5, 6, 454 N.E.2d
1321, 1322 (1983) (per curiam); State ex rel. O'Connell v. Kramer, 73 Wash. 2d 85, 86-
87, 436 P.2d 786, 787 (1968) (en banc). See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
13. See Grossman, supra note 12, at 113; see, e.g., Fine v. Firestone, 443 So. 2d 253,
256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 448 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1984);
State ex reL Voss v. Davis, 418 S.W.2d 163, 168 n.4 (Mo. 1967). See infra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 460 (Alaska 1974); Coalition for
Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 Ill. 2d 453, 460, 359 N.E.2d 138, 141
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in these cases, however, is more than merely semantic. It requires in-
quiry into the proper role of the judiciary within a system that provides
for popular legislation.15
The people of states that have placed restrictions on the content of a
proposal while it is still at the proposal stage intend to prohibit any elec-
tion on a proposal that does not comply.1" The Massachusetts Constitu-
tion, for example, provides that "[n]o proposition inconsistent with [the
freedom of elections] shall be the subject of an initiative. . petition."' ,
Because the constitution provides that the content of the petition itself,
not simply the power of the people to enact it, is restricted, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court properly conducted pre-election review
of a proposal's content to determine whether it was inconsistent with this
provision." Courts are derelict in performing their systemic duty when
(1976) (per curiam); Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 247, 69
N.E.2d 115, 127-28 (1946); State ex rel. Carson v. Kozer, 126 Or. 641, 646-47, 270 P.
513, 515 (1928) (en banc).
15. Although popular legislation embodies the salutary notion of giving the people
some direct control over the laws by which they are governed, it does present the threat
of majoritarian abuse. See infra note 35. Thus, some have argued that the judiciary
should interpose itself as an active defender of minority interests. Sirico, supra note 2, at
647. The theoretical underpinnings of judicial deference to the legislature developed and
reached crystalline form within a purely institutional framework: Courts, which were
checked by legislatures and executives, acted in turn to check those institutions. Judicial
ambivalence to the popular legislation process is well illustrated by the sharply differing
attitudes of Justices Hugo Black and William Douglas. Compare James v. Valtierra, 402
U.S. 137, 141 (1971) (majority opinion by Black, J.) ("[p]rovisions for referendums
demonstrate devotion to democracy") with Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 387 (1967)(Douglas, J., concurring) ("'the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended
. . . from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of
the Constituents' ") (quoting 5 Writings of James Madison 272 (Hunt ed. 1904) (empha-
sis in original)). The judiciary will generally adopt a deferential tone regarding popular
legislation. See, e.g., McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 332, 196 P.2d 787, 788 (1948)(en banc), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949); Oliver v. City of Tulsa, 654 P.2d 607, 613
(Okla. 1982).
16. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. II, § 8(d) (1911, amended 1976) ("An initiative measure
embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any ef-
fect."); Mass. Const. amend. XLVIII, Initiative, pt. 2, § 2 ("No proposition inconsistent
with any one of the following rights of the individual ... shall be the subject of an
initiative or referendum petition ... ."); Mo. Const. art. III, § 50 ('Petitions for consti-
tutional amendments shall not contain more than one amended and revised article...
or one new article which shall not contain more than one subject. . . . Petitions for laws
shall contain not more than one subject."); Nev. Coast. art. XIX, § 6 (1912, amended
1972) ("[The constitution] does not permit the proposal of any statute or statutory
amendment which makes an appropriation or otherwise requires the expenditure of
money, unless such statute or amendment also imposes a sufficient tax."); Or. Const. art.
IV, § l(2)(d) (1902, amended 1968) ("A proposed law or amendment. . . shall embrace
one subject only."). Commeniators have not recognized the difference between restric-
tions on petitions and limitations on the process of popular legislation. See, e.g., Com-
ment, Preelection Judicial Review: Taking the Initiative in Voter Protection, 71 Calif. L
Rev. 1216, 1228 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Taking the Initiative]; Comment, Judicial
Review of Initiative Constitutional Amendments, 14 U.C.D. L. Rev. 461, 474-79 (1980).
17. Mass. Coast. amend. XLVIII, Initiative, pt. 2, § 2.
18. See Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 247-48, 69 N.E.2d
115, 128 (1946). The Massachusetts court has recently applied Bowe to determine
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they decline to review such measures at the proposal stage.19 In Oregon,
courts have misconstrued the one-topic restriction to be only a limita-
tion.2" Although the state constitution provides that the "proposed law
...shall embrace one subject only,"21 the state court of appeals held
that it does not have the authority to examine whether this provision has
been violated until after the proposal has been adopted by the voters.22
The people of other states also restrict the scope of popular legislation
whether a proposal would amount to a law. See Paisner v. Attorney General, 390 Mass.
593, 597-98, 458 N.E.2d 734, 737-38 (1983). The extension is unwarranted, however.
Bowe involved a state constitutional provision that specifically prohibited certain topics
from appearing on petitions. See Bowe, 320 Mass. at 247-48, 69 N.E.2d at 128. The
relevant constitutional provision in Paisner was not a restriction on the initiative itself. It
simply defined the power of initiative as the power to enact laws. See Mass. Const.
amend. XLVIII, Definition, pt. 1. The Paisner court held that it may review whether the
proposal actually contemplated a law. See 390 Mass. at 598, 458 N.E.2d at 738. Lacking
specific statutory authority to review whether the proposal would have amounted to a
law, the Paisner court should have permitted the proposal to be placed before the voters.
19. In California, the state constitution clearly imposes a single subject restriction at
the proposal stage. See Cal. Const. art. II, § 8(d) (1911, amended 1976). See supra note
16. The state supreme court will not review for compliance until after the election unless
the restriction has clearly been violated. See Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 4, 641 P.2d
200, 201, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100, 101 (1982) (per curiam). The dissent in the case pointed out
that the constitutional provision should authorize review at the pre-election stage. See id,
at 6, 641 P.2d at 202, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 102 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The California posi-
tion is especially difficult to understand because the court has reviewed constitutional
amendment proposals before elections to test their substantive validity. The state consti-
tution provides specific procedures for constitutional revisions, as opposed to amend-
ments. See Cal. Const. art. XVIII, § 2. Revisions are wider in scope than amendments
because they may be used to alter the state constitution in any way that does not affront
the federal Constitution. McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 333, 196 P.2d 787, 789
(1948) (en banc), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949). Amendments are intended only to
improve the existing state constitution. Id. Although these provisions do not authorize
popular legislation, neither do they specifically forbid application of the initiative. See
Cal. Const. art. II, § 8 (1911, amended 1966). Nevertheless, the state supreme court has
held that it may examine a proposed constitutional amendment before an election and bar
its submission to the voters if it actually proposes a constitutional revision. See McFad-
den, 32 Cal. 2d at 332, 196 P.2d at 788. McFadden and Brosnahan may be harmonized if
one takes the position that the court will strike down only proposals that are clearly
invalid. Compare Brosnahan, 31 Cal. 3d at 4, 641 P.2d at 201, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 101 with
McFadden, 32 Cal. 2d at 332, 196 P.2d at 788-89.
20. See Barnes v. Paulus, 36 Or. App. 327, 336, 588 P.2d 1120, 1125, appeal denied
per curiam, 284 Or. 81, 588 P.2d 1084 (1978) (en banc). See infra note 22.
21. Or. Const. art. IV, § 1(2)(d) (1902, amended 1968) (emphasis added).
22. See Barnes v. Paulus, 36 Or. App. 327, 336, 588 P.2d 1120, 1125, appeal denied
per curiam, 284 Or. 81, 588 P.2d 1084 (1978) (en banc). The court based its decision on
an earlier case in which the supreme court held that it would not examine a statute for
validity prior to an election. See id. (citing State ex rel. Stadter v. Newbry, 189 Or. 691,
697, 222 P.2d 737, 740 (1950)). The Stadter holding, however, was based on the fact that
the state constitution did not authorize content review at the pre-election stage: "Neither
the constitution nor any statute gave power to the courts to declare a proposed law,
previous to its enactment, to be either constitutional or unconstitutional." Id. Subse-
quent to Stadter, a single topic restriction was placed in the state constitution. See Or.
Const. art. IV, § l(2)(d) (1968), amending Or. Const. art IV, § 1. The Barnes court's
reliance on Stadter is, therefore, misplaced.
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but do not authorize judicial review of content at the pre-election stage.'
Yet some courts have incorrectly held such restrictions to be threshold
requirements when they actually amount only to limitations.24 For
courts to assert power of review at this stage presents both conceptual
and policy problems.
The first problem is ripeness. In states that have limited the scope of
enacted initiatives, pre-election challenges require a court to examine the
initiative as if it has been enacted. Because there is no guarantee that the
initiative will be enacted, however, any alleged abuse of the initiative
power is only hypothetical, and judicial inquiry is therefore premature.?5
For example, although Illinois law mandates that "[a]mendments shall
be limited to structural and procedural subjects" contained in a specific
article of the state constitution,26 the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted
this restriction to be one of the "requirements for . . . proposing" an
amendment.' It then went on to review whether the subject matter of
the proposal met the threshold requirement.28 Similarly, Alaska law pro-
vides that the initiative "shall not be used to. . . enact local or special
legislation."'29 The state supreme court held that a proposal may be ex-
amined before an election to determine whether its enactment is inconsis-
tent with this restriction.3" The restriction does not make the election
23. In contrast to the restrictions listed supra at note 27, these are limitations on the
power of popular legislation in general. See, e.g., Alaska Const. art. XI, § 7 ("[t]he initia-
tive shall not be used to . . ."); Fla. Const. art. XI, § 3 (1968, amended 1972) ("The
power to propose the revision or amendment . . . of [the state] constitution ... is
reserved to the people, provided that, any such revision or amendment shall embrace but
one subject."); 111. Const. art. XIV, § 3 ("Amendments shall be limited to structural and
procedural subjects."); Mo. Const. art. III, § 51 ("[tlhe initiative shall not be used for
. . ."); Mont. Const. art. III, § 4(1) ("Itlhe people may enact laws by initiative on all
matters except. . ."); Ohio Const. art. II, § le ("[t]he powers [of] 'initiative' and 'refer-
endum' shall not be used..."); Wyo. Const. art. III, § 52(g) ("[tlhe initiative shall not
be used to...").
24. See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 47, 52 and accompanying text.
26. See Il. Const. art. XIV, § 3. The specific article is article IV. See id. Article IV
governs the structure and procedure of the state legislature. See id. art. IV.
27. Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 I11. 2d 453, 460, 359
N.E.2d 138, 141 (1976) (per curiam). The court perfunctorily dismissed prior case law
forbidding review until after enactment as applying only to proposed statutory enact-
ments and not to the proposed constitutional amendment. See id. The court found this
distinction and its holding to be "obvious" but did not provide specific authority for its
position. See id.
28. Id. at 463-72, 359 N.E.2d at 143-47. The court enjoined submission of the propo-
sal to the voters after engaging in a lengthy determination of the meaning of "structural
and procedural" subjects. See icL at 472, 359 N.E.2d at 147. See supra note 26.
29. Alaska Const. art. XI, § 7.
30. Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 460-61 (Alaska 1974). Boucher is interesting
because it involved constitutional and statutory restrictions. See id. at 460. Although the
constitutional restriction was framed as a limitation, see Alaska Const. ar. XI, § 7 ("the
initiative shall not be used to ... enact local or special legislation"), the statute created a
threshold requirement, see Alaska Stat. § 15.45.010 (1960) ("no initiative may be pro-
posed ... to enact local or special legislation"). The court was unable to distinguish the
two, stating that the statutory restriction "embodied" the constitutional limitation. See
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illegal, however; it simply makes void the proposal's contents, if
approved.31
Because the people of the state have established popular legislation as a
legitimate law-enacting process, the judiciary should accord the process
the same degree of deference that is accorded the legislative branch, un-
less there is specific statutory jurisdiction to review the content of pro-
posals before elections.32 Many states have placed restrictions on the
lawmaking authority of local government units.33 Courts, however, con-
sistently hold that they are without authority to enjoin these legislative
bodies from considering proposals that may be beyond their authority to
enact.34 Similarly, courts should not stop the voters from considering
528 P.2d at 460 n.13. The court then proceeded to examine the proposal's content. See
id. at 460. Boucher poses another problem. The statutory threshold requirement was
passed by the legislature. Id. at 460. The court assumed that it is within the legislature's
power to authorize judicial intervention into the process of a coordinate legislative actor.
In a subsequent case, the supreme court used Boucher to justify pre-election review of
general substantive validity. See Whitson v. Anchorage, 608 P.2d 759, 762 (Alaska 1980).
31. Like Alaska's, Ohio's restriction is framed as a limitation. See Ohio Const. art. II,
§ le. The state supreme court has treated it as such. See State ex rel. Cramer v. Brown,
7 Ohio St. 3d 5, 6, 454 N.E.2d 1321, 1321-22 (1983) (per curiam). However, it justified
nonreview by relying on cases in which Ohio courts had refused to review for general
substantive validity. See id. at 6, 454 N.E.2d at 1322 (citing State ex reL Marcolin v.
Smith, 105 Ohio St. 570, 572, 138 N.E. 881, 881 (1922) (per curiam) (court may not
decide whether proposed law violates federal Constitution or law enacted thereunder un-
til initiative process is complete) and Weinland v. Fulton, 99 Ohio St. 10, 10, 121 N.E.
816, 816 (1918) (per curiam) (court may not decide whether proposed law conflicts with
federal Constitution)).
The Florida one-subject restriction is framed as a limitation. See Fla. Const. art. XI,
§ 3 (1968, amended 1972). The state supreme court, however, has elected to review the
restriction at the pre-election phase, although with a strong presumption of the proposal's
validity. See Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Fla., 363 So. 2d 337, 339
(Fla. 1978) (per curiam). Perhaps the best way to account for this position is to realize
that Florida courts also undertake cursory reviews of proposals for general substantive
validity. See Fine v. Firestone, 443 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (single
subject requirement violated if "clearly and conclusively defective"; general substantive
invalidity exists only if proposal patently unconstitutional in entirety), vacated on other
grounds, 448 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1984)
32. See Grossman, supra note 16, at 112.
33. See, e.g., Ala. Const. art. XII, § 223 (local government may not make property
assessments for drainage or pavement construction in excess of rise in property value);
Ark. Const. art: XII, § 5 (local government may not purchase stock of, or make loan to,
corporation or association); Wyo. Const. art. XIII, § 3 (municipal government may not
tax or borrow except to pursue public purpose as specified by law).
34. See, e.g., Real Estate Dev. Co. v. City of Florence, 327 F. Supp. 513, 514-15 (E.D.
Ky. 1971); City of Phoenix v. Superior Court, 65 Ariz. 139, 144-45, 175 P.2d 811, 814-15
(1946) (per curiam); Ringwood Solid Waste Management Auth. v. Borough of Ring-
wood, 131 N.J. Super. 61, 66, 328 A.2d 258, 260-61 (1974); Rheinhardt v. Yancey, 241
N.C. 184, 188, 84 S.E.2d 655, 658 (1954). InRheinhardt, the court held that it would not
enjoin the legislative process when the challenge was directed only at the content of a
proposal, but that an injunction could issue if the process itself would be harmful to
individuals and the ordinance itself would be invalid anyway. See id. A federal court has
used this rationale to bar submission to voters of a referendum on an open housing ordi-
nance. See Otey v. Common Council, 281 F. Supp. 264, 279 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (black
plaintiff class and city would suffer great irreparable injury if referendum were held).
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proposals that may be beyond the lawmaking authority of the popular
legislation process.
One commentator argues that popular legislation is subject to fewer
checks and balances than is the legislature and that courts should there-
fore subject ballot proposals to review before they are voted on.35 States
have subjected the popular legislation process to checks, however, by es-
tablishing technical threshold requirements to weed out defective propos-
als. Typically, before a measure may be placed on the ballot, its
proponents must collect a sufficient number of valid signatures endorsing
it.3 6 In many states, the sponsors of a measure must demonstrate that its
35. See Taking the Initiative, supra note 27, at 1233-34 (advocating pre-election re-
view to ensure compliance as to form, scope and subject matter). In many ways, popular
legislation is antithetical to values held by the Founding Fathers. Madison believed that
pure democracies are inherently unstable and permit the majority interest to oppress mi-
norities. See The Federalist No. 10, at 59-60 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898). Republican
government was designed to remedy this. Inherent in Madison's espousal of republican-
ism over popular democracy was a belief that public officials are better able than private
citizens to submerge partisan interests to the general public good. See id. at 60. What
Madison could not have foreseen was that by 1900, political machines would take over
legislative institutions and wield public power in favor of special interests. See R. Hof-
stadter, The Age of Reform 255 (1955). The Progressive Movement, which developed
partly in response to machine politics, naturally believed that the average citizen was
more virtuous than the public official. See id. The Progressives therefore left a legacy of
electoral reforms, among them the initiative and referendum, which greatly increased
popular participation in government. See id. Progressives did not concern themselves
with Madison's fear of majoritarian excesses, believing that the average citizen made ra-
tional, intellectual choices that were devoid of self-interest. See id. at 257-59. Modern
commentators, however, have resurrected the Madisonian concerns. See Sirico, supra
note 2, at 647; Note, Constitutional Constraints on Initiative and Referendum, 32 Vand.
L. Rev. 1143, 1143 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Constraints]; Comment,
Judicial Review of Laws Enacted by Popular Vote, 55 Wash. L. Rev. 175, 189 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Judicial Review]. These commentators, however, have focused on
the judicial role once legislation has been enacted, advocating stricter judicial scrutiny of
popular legislation than of traditional legislation. See Grossman, supra note 12, at 108;
Sirico, supra, at 648; Constitutiuonal Constraints, supra, at 1151-52; Judicial Review,
supra, at 204-07.
36. Generally, states require that proposed constitutional amendments receive more
support than proposed statutes, and that proposed statutes receive more support than
proposed referenda. Intuitively, it makes sense to require less support for proposals that
would engender less sweeping results. The base total from which the percentage of re-
quired signatures is calculated is the total number of votes cast for all gubernatorial can-
didates at the most recent general election, unless otherwise indicated. See Alaska Coast.
art. XI, § 3 (1959, amended 1970) (10%--statute, 10%-referendum; based on total vote
in preceding general election); Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. I, § 1(2) (15%-amendment,
10%-statute); id. § 1(3) (5%-referendum); Ark. Const. amend. VII, § 1 (10%-
amendment, 8%-statute, 6%-referendum); Cal. Coast. art. II, § 8(b) (1911, amended
1976) (8%--amendment, 5%--statute); id. § 9(b) (1911, amended 1966) (5%-referen-
dum); Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(2) (1910, amended 1980) (5%---amendment, 5%--statute;
based on total vote for office of secretary of state at last election); id. § 1(3) (5 %--referen-
dum; based on total vote for office of secretary of state at last election); Fla. Coast. art.
XI, § 3 (1968, amended 1972) (8%-amendment; based on total vote in last presidential
election); Ill. Coast. art. XIV, § 3 (8%-amendment); Me. Coast. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18(2)
(1909, amended 1981) (10%-statute); id. § 17 (10%---referendum); Mass. Const.
amend. XLVIII, Initiative, pt. 4, § 2 (1918, amended 1950) (3%--amendment); id. pt. 5,
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support is geographically diverse within the state.37 As a final check,
completed forms must be submitted to designated authorities within a
specified period before the scheduled election. 38 These technical require-
§ I (3%-statute); id. Referendum, pt. 3, § 3 (2%-referendum); Mich. Const. art. XII,
§ 2 (10%-amendment); id. art. II, § 9 (8%-statute, 5%-referendum); Mont. Const.
art. III, § 4(2) (5%-statute); id. art. XIV, § 9(1) (10%-amendment); id. art. III, § 5(1)
(5%-referendum); Neb. Const. art. III, § 2 (10%-amendment, 7%-statute); 1d. § 3
(5%-referendum); Nev. Const. art. XIX, § 2(2) (1912, amended 1972) (10%-amend.
ment, 10%-statute; based on total vote in last preceding general election); 1d. § 1 (10%-
referendum; based on total vote in last preceding general election); N.D. Const. art III,
§ 9 (4%-amendment; based on population at last decennial census); id. § 4 (2%-stat-
ute, 2%-referendum; based on population at last decennial census); Ohio Const. art. II,
§ la (10%-amendment); id. § lb (3%-statute); id. § Ic (6%-referendum); Okla.
Const. art. V, § 2 (15%-amendment, 8%-statute, 5%-referendum; based on total
vote cast for state office receiving highest vote in previous general election); Or. Const.
art. IV, § 1(2)(c) (8%-amendment); id. § 1(2)(b) (6%-statute); id. § 1(3)(b) (4%-
referendum); S.D. Const. ar(. III, § 1 (5%-statute, 5%--referendum; based on number
of qualified electors); id. art. XXIII, § 1 (1898, amended 1972) (10%-amendment);
Wash. Const. art. II, § l(a) (1912, amended 1981) (8%-statute, 4%-referendum);
Wyo. Const. art. III, § 52(c) (15%-statute, 15%-referendum; based on number of
those who voted in previous general election); D.C. Code Ann. § 1-282(a) (5%-statute,
5%-referendum; based on number of registered voters). Idaho and Utah do not pre-
scribe a required number of signatures m their constitutions; rather, the number is to be
prescribed by statute. See Idaho Const. art. III, § 1 (1912, amended 1980) (statute, refer-
endum); Utah Const. art. VI, § 1(2) (statute). Missouri does not impose a state-wide
signature requirement but instead mandates support in two-thirds of the state's congres-
sional districts. See Mo. Const art. III, § 50. For a discussion of the signature technical
requirement's effect on the content of initiative proposals, see infra note 39.
37. Constitutional provisions are anything but uniform in this area, but all, to some
degree, ensure that a measure's proponents must expend at least minimal effort through-
out the state at the initiation stage. See, e.g., Alaska Const. art. XI, § 3 (1959, amended
1970) (statute and referendum signatories must reside in at least two-thirds of state's
election districts); Fla. Const. art. XI, § 3 (1968, amended 1972) (amendment must meet
8% signature requirement in one-half or more of congressional districts); Mass. Const.
amend. XLVIII, Gen., pt. 2 (no more than 25% of signatures may be from any one
county); Mo. Const. art III, § 50 (amendment must be supported in two-thirds of con-
gressional districts by 8% of registered voters; statute must receive 5% support); td.
§ 52(a) (referendum must receive 5% support in two-thirds of congressional districts);
Mont. Const. art. III, § 4(2) (statute must receive 5% support in at least one-third of
state legislative districts); id. § 5(l) (same requirement for referendum); Mont. Const. art.
XIV, § 9(1) (amendment must receive 10% support in at least 40% of state legislative
districts); Neb. Const. art. III, § 2 (amendment, statute or referendum must receive 5%
support from 40% of counties); Nev. Const. art. XIX, § 2(2) (1912, amended 1972)
(amendment and statute must receive 10% support from at least 75% of counties); Ohio
Const. art. II, § Ig (1912, amended 1978) (amendment, statute or referendum must re-
ceive support of at least one-half of required electors from one-half of counties); Wyo.
Const. art. III, § 52(c) (signatories must reside in at least two-thirds of state's counties);
D.C. Code Ann. § 1-282(a) (1981) (statute or referendum must meet 5% signature re-
quirement in five or more city wards).
38. States that have established constitutional guidelines all require initiative sponsors
to file forms at least three months before the election. See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1,
§ 1(4) (four months); Ark. Const. amend. VII, § 1 (same); Cal. Const. art. II, § 8(c)
(1911, amended 1976) (131 days); Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(2) (1910, amended 1980)
(three months); Ill. Const. art. XIV, § 3 (six months); Mich. Const. art. XII, § 2 (120
days); Mo. Const. art. III, § 50 (four months); Mont. Const. art. III, § 4(2) (three
months); Nev. Const. art. XIX, § 2(4) (1912, amended 1972) (90 days); N.D. Const. art.
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ments ensure that frivolous measures will not appear on the ballot and
that voters will be able to make informed decisions regarding the content
of proposals.3 9 Even if a substantively defective measure is placed before
the voters, however, the judiciary may always examine it after ap-
proval," in the same way that it may examine a law after enactment by
the state legislature.41 Courts will defer to the legislature partly because
the legislature is interested in preserving its institutional autonomy and
has the resources to do so successfully.42 Because popular legislation is
only a process, however, it lacks an established, organized support struc-
ture to defend it from judicial encroachment.43 Therefore, popular legis-
lation is far more vulnerable to judicial usurpation than is the legislature.
Because popular legislation is checked by technical requirements and be-
cause the content of ballot measures is subject to post-election review,
there is no reason for judicial intervention unless the state has explicitly
granted the judiciary such power.
III, § 5 (same); Or. Const. art. IV, § l(2)(e) (1902, amended 1968) (four months); S.D.
Const. art. XXIII, § 1 (1898, amended 1972) (one year); Wash. Const. art. II, § l(a)
(1912, amended 1981) (four months).
39. The signature requirement acts as a quality check on proposal content because it
assures that only issues that arouse the public interest will be voted on. See Sirico, supra
note 3, at 659-60; Note, Initiative and Referendum-Do They Encourage or Impair Better
State Government?, 5 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 925, 948-49 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Initiative
and Referendum]; Note, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 922, 924 (1975) [hereinafter cited as California Initiative Process]. The time
limit for submission ensures that voters will have sufficient time to consider the merits of
a proposal and will not vote impulsively. See Sirico, supra note 2, at 670. Additionally,
the geographic diversity requirement may prevent one section of a state from proposing
and passing laws for its own benefit at the expense of others in the state.
Compliance with technical requirements is fully reviewable at the pre-election stage.
See, e.g., Newsome v. Riley, 69 Mich. App. 725, 730, 245 N.W.2d 374, 376 (1976) (re-
viewing compliance with timely filing requirement); State ex rel. Helgerson v. Riif 73
S.D. 467, 472-73, 44 N.W.2d 126, 129 (1950) (reviewing compliance wvith signature
requirement).
40. Iman v. Bolin, 98 Ariz. 358, 365, 404 P.2d 705, 709 (1965) (en banc); McKee v.
City of Louisville, 200 Colo. 525, 530, 616 P.2d 969, 972-73 (1980) (en bane); State ex rel.
Marcolin v. Smith, 105 Ohio St. 570, 572, 138 N.E. 881, 881 (1922) (per curiam); State ex
rel. Carson v. Kozer, 126 Or. 641, 646, 270 P. 513, 515 (1928) (en banc).
41. See, e.g., Whitson v. Anchorage, 608 P.2d 759, 762 (Alaska 1980); Mulkey v.
Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 533-34, 413 P.2d 825, 826, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884 (1966), aff'd,
387 U.S. 369 (1967). See supra note 11.
42. State legislatures currently command tremendous personal and financial re-
sources. There are 7438 state legislators in the United States. The Book of the States
1984-85, at 85 Table 2 (J. Gardner & L. Purcell 25th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Book
of States]. Annual compensation reaches $48,000 per legislator in Alaska. Id. at 92-93
Table 6. In addition, all legislators have a personal staff, id. at 124 Table 21, and many
legislative committees are staffed, id. at 121 Table 19.
43. Popular legislation was originally intended to rectify problems caused by the in-
trusion of political machines into political institutions. See R. Hofstadter, supra note 35,
at 255. Thus, no institutional framework exists for the process. Typically, a proposal is
certified by the secretary of state, a member of the executive department. See, e.g., Cal.
Const. art II, § 8(c) (1911, amended 1976); Mont. Const. art. III, §§ 4-5; Nev. Coast. art.
XIX, § 2(3),(4) (1912, amended 1972). Only the sponsors of a proposal, however, have
sufficient interest and expertise to defend the proposal against judicial encroachment.
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II. GENERAL SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS ON THE INITIATIVE
PROCESS
Whether laws are enacted by the legislature or by the voters, they are
subject to general substantive restrictions imposed by the federal and
state constitutions and federal statutes.44 Most courts refuse to conduct
pre-election review of initiative proposals for general substantive valid-
ity."5 The reasons for nonreview, however, are not uniform. Some
courts hold that they do not possess jurisdiction to decide the issue. 46
Others view the problem as one of ripeness, holding that they will not
issue advisory opinions.47 Still others analogize to judicial noninterfer-
ence with legislative proceedings and thus refuse to interfere with popu-
lar legislation.48
Regardless of the reasoning employed, the nonreview position has sev-
eral advantages. It recognizes that measures enactedby popular legisla-
tion are as valid as those enacted by the legislature. 49 Nonreview also
promotes judicial efficiency. Over fifty percent of ballot proposals are
rejected at the polls.50 Courts that do not review beforehand therefore
save the time and expense involved in reviewing proposals that may ulti-
mately be rejected by the voters.51 Nonreview also allows courts to avoid
44. See supra note 11.
45. See Grossman, supra note 12, at 111; see, e.g., Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d
456, 460 & n. 13 (Alaska 1974); City of Rocky Ford v. Brown, 133 Colo. 262, 264-65, 293
P.2d 974, 976 (1956) (en bane); Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230,
247, 69 N.E.2d 115, 127 (1946); Leininger v. Alger, 316 Mich. 644, 654-55, 26 N.W.2d
348, 353 (1947); Anderson v. Byrne, 62 N.D. 218, 229, 242 N.W. 687, 692 (1932); State
ex rel. Williams v. Brown, 52 Ohio St. 2d 13, 17-18, 368 N.E.2d 838, 841 (1977) (per
curiam); State ex rel. Donohue v. Coe, 49 Wash. 2d 410, 418, 302 P.2d 202, 206-07
(1956) (en banc).
46. See, e.g., Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai County Bd. of Supervi-
sors, 108 Ariz. 449, 452, 501 P.2d 391, 393-94 (1972) (en banc); State ex rel. Donohue v.
Coe, 49 Wash. 2d 410, 416, 302 P.2d 202, 206-07 (1956) (en banc).
47. See, e.g., City of Rocky Ford v. Brown, 133 Colo. 262, 266, 293 P.2d 974, 976
(1956) (en banc); Slack v. City of Salem, 31 11. 2d 174, 178, 201 N.E.2d 119, 121 (1964);
State ex rel. Dahl v. Lange, 661 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); Anderson v. Byrne, 62
N.D. 218, 229, 242 N.W. 687, 692 (1932); State ex rel. O'Connell v. Kramer, 73 Wash.
2d 85, 86-87, 436 P.2d 786, 787 (1968) (en bane).
48. See, e.g., Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 247, 69 N.E.2d
115, 127 (1946); State ex rel. Stokes v. Roach, 190 S.W. 277, 280 (Mo. 1916) (en banc);
Anderson v. Byrne, 62 N.D. 218, 229-30, 242 N.W. 687, 692 (1932); Threadgill v. Cross,
26 Okla. 403, 412-13, 109 P. 558, 561-62 (1910); State ex rel. Carson v. Kozer, 126 Or.
641, 647, 270 P. 513, 515 (1928) (en banc).
49. See State ex rel. Bullard v. Osborn, 16 Ariz. 247, 249, 143 P. 117, 118 (1914) (per
curiam); Hamilton v. Secretary of State, 227 Mich. 111, 124, 198 N.W. 843, 847 (1924);
Threadgill v. Cross, 26 Okla. 403, 413, 109 P. 558, 562 (1910); State ex rel. Evans v. Riiff,
73 S.D. 348, 352, 42 N.W.2d 887, 889 (1950); cf. Grossman, supra note 12, at 112 (popu-
lar legislation deserves same amount of judicial deference as traditional legislation).
50. From 1980 to 1983, there were 23 popular proposals to amend state constitutions.
Only eight were approved at the polls. Book of the States, supra note 42, at 212 Table A;
see California Initiative Process, supra note 39, at 927 (in 63 years, nearly 75% of ballot
initiatives in California have been defeated).
51. See Slack v. City of Salem, 31 Ill. 2d 174, 178, 201 N.E.2d 119, 121 (1964) (issues
raised may never progress beyond realm of hypothetical); Hamilton v. Secretary of State,
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deciding issues that lack concrete adverseness.2 Finally, this posture
permits higher quality judicial decisionmaking if and when the measure
is placed before the court for post-election review because the court may
have more time to consider it.13
Despite the conceptual and policy reasons calling for pre-election def-
erence, several state courts review the general substantive content of pro-
posals. The Montana Supreme Court, for example, enjoined an election,
holding that the content of an initiative proposal violated the state consti-
tution.54 In Florida, the court has held that it will enjoin elections when
the challenged proposal is "clearly and conclusively defective."" Both
227 Mich. 111, 122-23, 198 N.W. 843, 847 (1924) (if proposal is not approved, court need
not pass on validity). One might make the same argument regarding review for technical
compliance of the petition; however, the issue in such a case is the validity of the election
itself, not its possible results.
52. See City of Rocky Ford v. Brown, 133 Colo. 262, 265-66, 293 P.2d 974, 976
(1956) (en bane); Slack v. City of Salem, 31 Ml. 2d 174, 178, 201 N.E.2d 119, 121 (1964);
Hamilton v. Secretary of State, 212 Mich. 31, 36-37, 179 N.W. 553, 555 (1920) (Sharpe,
J., concurring). This point is admittedly not a strong one because the proposal, unlike a
legislative proposal that is subject to modification, will appear on the ballot exactly as it
appeared on the petition. A pre-election examination is arguably hypothetical, yet it is
distinguishable from a post-election examination only with regard to timing, not with
regard to the judiciary's ability to review the initiative thoroughly. See Whitson v.
Anchorage, 608 P.2d 759, 762 n.5 (Alaska 1980). The closely related advisory opinion
rationale is also suspect for the same reasons.
53. See Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 2 (Alaska 1979) (difficult constitutional ques-
tions cannot be decided in short time before election); AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687,
718, 686 P.2d 609, 630, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89, 110 (en banc) (Lucas, J., dissenting) (court
cannot, in "rush to judgment" case, fashion reasoned determination of complex issues),
stay denied sub nor. Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 105 S. Ct. 5 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1984);
see, e.g., Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 83 Ill. 2d 236, 237-38,
415 N.E.2d 368, 369-70 (1980) (leave granted to file for stay on August 1I, briefing expe-
dited, oral argument heard on August 25, decision announced on September 2); In re
Initiative Petition No. 314, 625 P.2d 595, 613 (Okla. 1980) (Opala, J., concurring) (pro-
test filed August 28, evidentiary proceedings not to begin until September 11, election on
November 4).
54. State ex rel. Steen v. Murray, 144 Mont. 61, 66, 394 P.2d 761, 763-64 (1964) (per
curiam). The state constitution contained a general prohibition against lotteries. See
Mont. Const. of 1889, art. XIX, § 2, superseded by Mont. Const. of 1972, art. III, § 9.
The court held that the initiative proposal contemplated a lottery and so was "clearly and
palpably unconstitutional." 144 Mont. at 66, 394 P.2d at 764.
55. Eg., Fine v. Firestone, 443 So. 2d 253, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), vacated on
other grounds, 448 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1984); Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let's
Help Fla., 363 So. 2d 337, 342 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam). The standard is based on earlier
case law holding that popular voting on a constitutional amendment drafted by the legis-
lature can be enjoined if it "plainly, palpably and inevitably" violated the federal Consti-
tution. Gray v. Moss, 115 Fla. 701,707, 156 So. 262, 264 (1934) (en bane). Other courts
have also held that although they will not examine content at the pre-election stage,
proposals that are patently defective may be removed from the ballot. See, e.g., State ex
reL Dahl v. Lange, 661 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (unless amendment is unconsti-
tutional on face, court will allow submission to voters); State ex rel Samuelson v. Con-
rad, 25 Ohio Misc. 13, 15, 265 N.E.2d 803, 807 (few courts would not enjoin submission
of proposal that is facially, unquestionably and palpably unconstitutional) (citing State ex
reL Marcolin v. Smith, 105 Ohio St. 570, 601-02, 138 N.F_. 881, 890-91 (1922) (per
curiam) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting)), aff'd mem., 265 N.E,2d at 803 n.I (Ohio Ct. App.),
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courts reason that pre-election review protects taxpayers from the "use-
less" public expenditures necessary to fund an election.56 This expendi-
ture, however, is no more useless than the time and money expended on
other legislative proceedings that may ultimately produce an infirm law.
Democracy, whether direct or indirect, necessarily involves procedural
inefficiencies that may require significant spending of public monies.
5 7
Inefficiency and cost alone do not justify enjoining popularly mandated
legislative processes."
There are additional problems presented by those courts that will
strike only proposals that are clearly or palpably invalid. Courts review-
ing under this standard often certify the proposal for election only to
have it challenged again soon after approval at the polls.5 9 The judicial
system may therefore be twice burdened with determining the validity of
a single proposal. Certainly courts conducting such a cursory review at
the pre-election stage will not deny that they possess the raw power to
conduct a full-fledged pre-election review. Under a cost-benefit analysis,
it seems anomalous to perform a less stringent review in the first in-
stance, only to encourage opponents of the measure to challenge it again,
forcing additional expenditures.
Finally, judicial review shortly before an election may prevent voters
from being properly educated about the proposal's contents." Neither
appeal dismissed, 265 N.E.2d at 803 n. 1 (Ohio 1968); White v. Welling, 89 Utah 335, 340-
41, 57 P.2d 703, 705 (1936) (per curiam) (court will not compel secretary of state to place
facially unconstitutional proposal on ballot).
56. West Palm Beach Ass'n of Firefighters v. Board of City Comm'rs, 448 So. 2d
1212, 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (city ordinance); State ex rel. Steen v. Murray, 144
Mont. 61, 67, 394 P.2d 761, 764 (1964) (per curiam) (state statute). Other states also use
the rationale of limiting public expenditures in order to conduct a pre-election review.
See, eg., Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 Il1. 2d 453, 461, 359
N.E.2d 138, 142 (1976) (per curiam); In re Initiative Petition No. 314, 625 P.2d 595, 607
(Okla. 1980). The courts do not weigh relative costs in their calculations. Apparently
they believe that public funding in itself justifies the power of review.
57. See Threadgill v. Cross, 26 Okla. 403, 414-15, 109 P. 558, 562-63 (1910).
58. See Legislature of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 682, 669 P.2d 17, 34, 194
Cal. Rptr. 781, 798 (1983) (en banc) (per curiam) (Richardson, J., dissenting); State ex
rel. Evans v. Riiff, 73 S.D. 348, 352, 42 N.W.2d 887, 889 (1950). Courts that conduct
review based on the cost of what would allegedly be a useless election may be simply
attempting to expand judicial power without providing a theoretical underpinning of sup-
port. It is notable that courts justifying such review assert that they are not in fact con-
ducting it. See Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 667, 669 P.2d at 21, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 785
(holding that not even cursory substantive examination needed, and then proceeding to
analyze validity thoroughly); cf. White v. Welling, 89 Utah 335, 340-41, 57 P.2d 703,
705-06 (1936) (per curiam) (secretary of state may not judge validity of proposal but may
examine proposal to see if it actually proposes law).
59. E.g., Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 240-41, 651 P.2d 274, 276, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 30, 32 (1982) (en bane); Hawn v. County of Ventura, 73 Cal. App. 3d 1009, 1012-
13, 141 Cal. Rptr. 111, 112 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978).
60. All proposal petitions must be submitted at least three months prior to the elec-
tion. See supra note 53. Thus, sufficient time is provided for voters to analyze the propo-
sal and make an informed decision regarding its merits. See supra note 39. Ironically, by
reviewing measures so close in time to an election, courts neutralize this technical re-
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proponents nor opponents of a measure are likely to expend effort con-
cerning its passage while the measure is before the court. As a result,
public exposure to both views of the initiative will be limited, thus de-
priving voters of information they will need should an election occur.
These factors have not dissuaded the California Supreme Court from
adopting a unique position that amounts to pre-election substantive re-
view. In Legislature of California v. Deukmejian,"' opponents of a pro-
posal that called for redrawing the state's legislative and congressional
boundary lines asserted that the proposal violated a state constitutional
provision that permitted such legislation only one time within a decade.62
The court held that the challenge did not "require even a cursory exami-
nation of the substance of the initiative"6 3 because the constitution did
not permit either the legislature or the voters to enact such legislation.6
The court ordered that the proposal not be placed before the voters.65
quirement, thereby allowing the proposal to be submitted to fewer procedural checks
than the framers of the state constitution intended. See In re Initiative Petition No. 314,
625 P.2d 595, 613-14 (Okla. 1980) (Opala, J., concurring).
61. 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983) (en band) (per curiam).
62. See id. at 663, 669 P.2d at 18, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 782. In 1981, the state legislature
had reapportioned congressional and state legislative boundary lines, pursuant to 1980
census data. In a statewide referendum in 1982, the voters struck down the reapportion-
ment plan. In early 1983, the legislature established new boundaries for districts. Oppo-
nents of the congressional reapportionment plan did not file referendum papers in time to
challenge it. The state legislative reapportionment plan was passed as an urgency statute
and therefore was not subject to referendum. See id. at 667-68, 669 P.2d at 21-22, 194
Cal. Rptr. at 785-86. Opponents of the reapportionment plans used the initiative process
to attempt once again to redraw congressional and state boundary lines. They fulfilled
state technical requirements for getting the initiative on the ballot for a special election in
December 1983. See id. at 663-64, 669 P.2d at 19, 194 Cal Rptr. at 783. Opponents
challenged the measure's validity, arguing, among other things, that it would violate a
provision of the state constitution, providing for only one redistricting after each census,
id. at 664-65, 669 P.2d at 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784, that it would violate federal and state
guarantees of equal protection, id., 669 P.2d at 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784, and that it
would violate the state's initiative-specific one-topic restriction because the proposal
would redraw both federal congressional boundaries and state legislative boundaries, id.,
669 P.2d at 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
It might be noted that the court elected to review an alleged substantive defect-the
violation of article XXI of the state constitution-rather than the alleged violation of the
one-topic restriction. See id. at 673-80 & n.19, 669 P.2d at 25-30 & n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr.
at 789-94 & n.19. Perhaps this is not suprising given California's misinterpretation of its
one-topic requirement. See supra note 19.
63. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 667, 669 P.2d at 21, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
64. See id.; accord AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687, 696, 686 P.2d 609, 614, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 94 (en banc), stay denied sub nom. Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 105 S. Ct. 5 (Rehnquist,
Circuit Justice 1984). Thus, the court seemed to embrace the posture of the Florida
courts. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Richardson argued that the projected high cost of the
forthcoming election did not justify pre-election review and that the proposal, far from
being clearly invalid, was "plainly constitutional and valid." Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at
681, 669 P.2d at 34, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 798 (Richardson, J., dissenting). It may be argued,
therefore, that the court chose to review the measure in as thorough a manner as if the
measure had been adopted. If so, California is the first and thus far the only state to set a
single standard for pre-election and post-election review of initiative measures.
65. See Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 681, 669 P.2d at 31, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 795. In
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Regardless of the court's holding, its examination was substantive.
Strictly speaking, neither voters nor legislatures have the "power" to en-
act unconstitutional legislation. The legislation, however, offended the
constitution only because of its content. An examination into the consti-
tutionality of a proposal or enactment, therefore, necessarily involves
evaluation of content. Nevertheless, in AFL-CIO v. Eu,16 the California
court recently sanctioned pre-election review of a measure that proposed
compelling the state legislature to petition Congress for a Constitutional
Convention at which a balanced budget amendment to the federal Con-
stitution would be debated.67 Finding that the voters did not possess the
"power" to force the legislature to draft such a petition,68 the court en-
joined its submission to the voters.69 In both Deukmejian and AFL-CIO,
the court held that either the federal or state constitution does not grant
holding that the proposal was beyond the power of voters to initiate and approve, the
supreme court also held that the state legislature could not adopt similar legislation. See
id. at 680, 669 P.2d at 30, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 794. Because the court based its authority to
decide the case on whether the electorate had the "jurisdiction" to enact such legislation,
see id. at 667, 669 P.2d at 21, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 785, it would appear that the court could
also enjoin the legislature from approving similar legislation. The high cost of conducting
an election, however, may explain the court's examination into whether the proposal was
valid. See id. at 666, 669 P.2d at 21, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 785. But see supra note 58.
66. 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (en banc), stay denied sub nor.
Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 105 S. Ct. 5 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1984).
67. See id. at 696-97, 686 P.2d at 614-15, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95. The proposal gave
the state legislature the option either to petition Congress for a Constitutional Conven-
tion to debate the adoption of a balanced budget amendment, or to forfeit the compensa-
tion and perquisites of all members of the legislature. See id. at 694, 686 P.2d at 612, 206
Cal. Rptr. at 92.
68. See id. at 697, 686 P.2d at 615, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
69. See id. at 716, 686 P.2d at 629, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 109. The court based its author-
ity to review on the Deukmejian decision. See AFL-CIO, 36 Cal. 3d at 696, 686 P.2d at
614, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 94. The proposals were held to be invalid, however, for dissimilar
reasons. In Deukmejian, the proposal was held to be substantively defective because it
exceeded general legislative powers. Neither the voters nor the legislature could have
validly enacted it. See Legislature of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 680, 669 P.2d
17, 30, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781, 794 (1983) (en banc) (per curiam). See supra note 65. In
AFL-CIO, however, the proposal was held to be defective because if enacted, it could not
have been a statute, and it thus was beyond the initiative power reserved to the voters.
See 36 Cal. 3d at 715, 686 P.2d at 628, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 108; see also Cal. Const. art. II,
§ 8(a) (1911, amended 1976) ("The initiative is the power. . . to propose statutes...
and to adopt or reject them.").
Thus, the California position is almost completely incongruous. The court will not
examine a measure before an election for an alleged violation of an initiative-specific re-
striction, see Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 4, 641 P.2d 200, 201, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100, 101
(1982) (per curiam) (it is more appropriate to review allegation that proposal embraces
more than one topic after election), yet it will undertake an exhaustive examination if the
proposal would amount to action not specifically reserved to the people, see AFL-CIO, 36
Cal. 3d at 697-715, 686 P.2d at 615-28, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 95-108 (attempt to compel
legislators to petition Congress for constitutional amendment amounts to resolution that
is not within initiative power).
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such power to the voters.7" In effect, the state supreme court treated
substantive validity as a threshold requirement, and then proceeded to
examine content thoroughly. As previously discussed, however, there is
no constitutional authority and little conceptual justification for treating
general substantive validity as a threshold requirement.
CONCLUSION
There is a natural and intended tension between the judicial and legis-
lative branches of government. Should courts attempt to encroach on
the prerogatives of the state legislature, members of that institution have
not only the resources to resist, but also a self-interested goal of preserv-
ing institutional autonomy. Popular legislation, in contrast, is only a
process, not an institution. The danger of judicial usurpation of that pro-
cess is therefore ever present.
Courts must recognize that unless state law provides otherwise, the
degree of judicial deference to the popular legislation process should be
no less than the degree of deference accorded the legislature. Though
popular democracy is not without faults, states that have adopted it to
supplement the powers of the legislative body have recognized it as a
legitimate law-enacting process. Its products, whether constitutional
amendments or statutes, are of course subject to the same judicial scru-
tiny as are laws passed by the legislature. Courts that take it upon them-
selves to restrict the operation of the process before it has run its course
only derogate its validity and utility. As a result, popular respect for the
judiciary declines and public frustration with government institutions in-
creases. Because courts can review the content of ballot proposals after
enactment, they should not review proposals substantively at any earlier
time, unless the people of the state, through specific provisions of state
laws, have granted courts this power.
Michael J. Farrell
70. See AFL-CIO, 36 Cal. 3d at 715, 686 P.2d at 628, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 108;
Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 667, 669 P.2d at 21, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
The "power" in both cases referred to general substantive power. See supra notes 61-
69 and accompanying text.
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